



Editorial: Insurance and the Economization of Uncertainty

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Editorial: Insurance and the Economization of Uncertainty

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When one reads newspapers or watches TV nowadays, one is struck by the amount of news on the economy and, especially, the portrayal of the state of economy as increasingly fragile and uncertain. At least since the beginning of the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis, the media has constantly bombarded its audience with stories about how bleak and, perhaps more importantly, unpredictable the economic future seems. Economic news has become ever more central to the way in which we understand our world. In combination with its somber tone, this also creates certain myopia for the observer. It is easy to forget that uncertainty has been characteristic of economic life as long as there has been something called 'economic life'. What is new, however, is the pervasive *economization* of uncertainty. More precisely, it is only recently that uncertainty *in itself* has become a fundamental component of economic life. A crucial role in this is played by the technical means with which uncertainties are managed. When uncertainty is standardized, homogenized and made calculable, it can be given a price and it can be bought and sold. Not only has it been economized, it has been made into an essential commodity of current capitalism.

In the context of this special issue¹, the word 'economization' is important in both of its two meanings. First, in everyday usage the term refers to the efficient use of resources. This points to the importance of studying the ways in which life's complexity is trimmed down with equipment designed to reduce uncertainty, including insurance policies, health care arrangements, pensions, and saving plans. The second meaning of the term 'economization' is more specific. It derives from Çalişkan and Callon's (2009; 2010) recent reframing of the project of studying 'performativity' in the creation of markets. Here, 'economization' refers to the way in which diverse practices are rendered as 'economic'. In this usage 'economization' does not refer only to orthodox economics and its applications; in addition, practices such as accounting, actuarial calculations, marketing, logistics and the design of commercial spaces may all contribute to the emergence of the 'economic' (see also Callon 1998; Callon et al. 2007; MacKenzie 2006; 2009; MacKenzie et al. 2007).

On a general level, it is easy to detect three main forms in which uncertainty is 'economized'. To begin with, multiple risk technologies have been developed to 'tame' uncertainty by attempting to predict and manage the extent of (economic) harm. These have been used in various fields of practice, not only in finance, engineering and infrastructure maintenance but also in health care, for example. Insurance is pre-eminent among risk technologies. Insurance practices operate through standardizing harmful events, giving them monetary value, and spreading and mitigating their effects. During the 20th century, a range of insurance tools were used by states, private businesses and households in order to gain a degree of control over uncertainty. Consequently, insurance has received the attention of scholars interested in the ways in which the contemporary way of life is governed (e.g., Castel 1995; Donzelot 1994; Ewald 1986; Erikson et al. 2003; Evers & Nowotny 1987; Rothstein 2008).

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3 At the same time, however, there is a reverse side to risk technologies as means for reducing
4 the amount of uncertainty. This second general form of economizing uncertainty concerns the positive
5 side, the practices of ‘embracing risk’ (Baker & Simon 2002). In other words, especially in the
6 financial sector, the use of probability statistics has provided opportunities for not only managing the
7 harms encountered in the uncertain future, but also for *taking chances* in a manner that is, to a degree,
8 controlled. O’Malley (2004), for example, analyses how, in the liberal tradition, uncertainty –
9 especially in contrast to risk defined as something that can be measured – is not only something that
10 people and organisations want to minimize, but it has been seen as providing opportunities for
11 profitable future action for the entrepreneur. The supporters of this view argue that ‘uncertainty may
12 be creative, generating profit and wealth’ (2004, p. 19). So where the first general form of
13 economizing uncertainty is about the management of insecurity, the second one is about the
14 opportunities that uncertainty presents. Until recently, this side has received considerably less
15 attention in social sciences than those risk discourses and practices that emphasize harm reduction.

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23 The third general form of economizing uncertainty partly overlaps with the two previous
24 ones, yet is a kind of meta level and thus merits consideration of its own. Much of contemporary
25 financial life centres on the capacity to master the *ratio* between risk and profit. It is the *management*
26 *of this ratio* – not simply doing away with uncertainty or making use of the possibilities it offers – that
27 becomes the most important source of profit-making for the service provider. The distinction is one of
28 perspective: whereas economizing uncertainty by reducing it, or by engaging positively with it, has to
29 do with the *consumption* or use of risk technologies to domesticate uncertainty, offering services and
30 instruments which promise to help to manage the ratio between these two is more about the
31 *production* side of the same technologies. Uncertainty here is organized not for the sake of one’s own
32 need but for others’ use. The management of uncertainty becomes a service commodity that is
33 produced for the market. Obviously, most players in the financial sector, among them various rating
34 agencies, consulting firms and insurance companies, make big business out of providing the means to
35 organize uncertainty. If you go to a bank to discuss your economic situation, the first thing you will be
36 asked to do is to assess the levels of risk you think you can support, and relate this to what you can
37 save, how much money you want to borrow or expect to earn. The primary thing many banks try to
38 sell nowadays is this presumed knowledge of how to control the ratio between risk and profit.
39 Consequently, the client of an investment provider or money lender does not so much have to decide
40 how big a gain she is after, or how much money she wants to borrow, but what her risk level and its
41 ratio to expected gains is.

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52 All in all, uncertainty has become at once not only a source of concern but also the premise
53 for commercial action and the basis for financial profit making. Hence the proliferation of contrasting
54 marketing arguments: ‘Beware of the risks you might face!’ ‘Profit from the opportunities that the
55 uncertain future provides!’ In a double move, the actors in the financial sector sell a world view which
56 emphasizes the uncertainty of the future while, simultaneously, they claim that they are the ones who
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3 provide tools for managing this uncertainty. Simply put, they highlight and produce the need for the
4 services that they themselves are in a position to offer. At the same time, the insured subject is
5 formatted around the moral call to act responsibly, with foresight and prudence, as regards the future
6 – a classical topos of liberal thought (Ewald 1986; Langley 2008; O'Malley 2004). No wonder the
7 news is full of stories about the unpredictability of economic life. Yet as the papers in this special
8 issue make clear, while all of the above is pertinent, to remain on this general level of analysis would
9 be insufficient. That is, there is a need for a more detailed examination of, first, what exactly is the
10 conceptual and practical relationship between 'uncertainty' and 'risk'; second, *how* is uncertainty
11 being economized; and finally, what kind of social scientific research traditions are useful for
12 approaching these topics. The papers collected here tackle these questions by exploring the challenges
13 raised by insurance in a variety of very different empirical settings.
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20 21 **Risk and uncertainty as close relatives**

22 An influential text for the analyses of uncertainty and risk is Frank H. Knight's *Risk, Uncertainty and*
23 *Profit*, originally published in 1921 (2006). Reviewing the basic orthodox economics of his time he
24 examined the ways in which profit arises in the context of free competition. His main claim was that
25 economic theory had failed to make a strict conceptual distinction between two kinds of risk, the first
26 of which concerns statistical probability calculations, and the second, unique instances and events, the
27 likelihood and success of which can only be estimated, not calculated. The first one he calls 'risk'
28 proper, and the latter 'true uncertainty' (Knight 2006, pp. 46; 232–233). According to Knight, profit
29 only arises from the latter, the chance occurrences. This is because if the probability of events is more
30 or less known, as it always is when risk calculations can be applied, competitive markets make sure
31 that no one can gain in the long run. Profit is 'the one true residual in distribution' (Knight 2006, p.
32 lxii). Knight insists that it is the role of the entrepreneur to bear the results of true uncertainty, both the
33 positive and negative profits which it gives birth to. Therefore, uncertainty is not a negative thing but
34 a positive precondition for profit making. When a business decision on a large commitment is made,
35 to take Knight's own example (pp. 226–227), there is no way to calculate the likelihood of the
36 business succeeding. This cannot be done *a priori*. Nor are there large numbers available. Yet there is
37 information available on somewhat similar cases, and thus the decision can be made based on judged
38 opinions, educated guesses. For someone who is constantly able to make such estimations
39 successfully, true uncertainty is a friend, according to Knight.
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50 When summarizing his position, Knight comes to define 'risk' in a fashion which amounts to
51 a determinism of large numbers – although it must be said that elsewhere in the book his discourse is
52 more nuanced. From this idea follows the role he gives to insurance. For him, insurance is the prime
53 example of 'the principle of eliminating uncertainty by dealing with groups of cases instead of
54 individual cases' (Knight, 2006, p. 245).
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3 'The fact is that while a single situation involving a known risk may be regarded as
4 "uncertain", this uncertainty is easily converted into effective certainty; for in a considerable
5 number of such cases the results become predictable in accordance with the laws of chance,
6 and the error in such prediction approaches zero as the number of cases is increased. Hence it
7 is simply a matter of an elementary development of business organization to combine a
8 sufficient number of cases to reduce the uncertainty to any desired limits. This is, of course,
9 what is accomplished by the institution of insurance.' (Knight 2006, p. 46)
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15 It is striking how easy the management of risk is in Knight's opinion. Yet it could be claimed that this
16 is just his manner of emphasizing how rarely it is the case that exact numbers are available, and how
17 important but underappreciated the phenomenon of unmeasurable uncertainty is.
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20 Because of its apparent clarity Knight's conceptual distinction is often followed, more or less
21 consciously, at least on the level of social theory. Insurance, then, is understood as the realm of risk
22 proper. Hence when Ulrich Beck originally made his 'risk society' thesis, he started from the premise
23 that insurance practice strictly follows the actuarial logic, and is sterile when exact calculations on
24 probability are absent (Beck 1986). Similarly, in his magnum opus *L'État providence*, published in
25 the same year, François Ewald discusses the concept of risk in the context of insurance solely in
26 relation to the ability to calculate the frequency and cost of a harmful event (Ewald 1986, pp. 175–
27 181). More recent social scientific scholarship on risk and uncertainty has, however, started to call
28 into question the rigidity of this distinction, as we discuss below. Still, Knight's ideas can be useful, in
29 at least two respects. First, highlighting the positive and creative role of uncertainty, in contrast to
30 calculable risk, has a sensitizing and even sobering effect on social scientists immersed in various
31 discourses on 'risk society' or 'cultures of risk', where both risk and uncertainty are often – and way
32 too simply – equated with threat.² In addition, in its dogmatic clarity Knight's distinction between risk
33 and uncertainty gives a good background against which it is possible to draw attention to the focus of
34 this theme issue: the *plurality* of the ways in which uncertainty is being tamed, standardized and
35 calculated in insurance.
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44 To begin with, empirical work has shown that in practice insurance underwriting is not
45 always dependent on the availability of exact calculation; this is most evident in the case of
46 catastrophe risk (Bougen 2003; Collier 2008). Perhaps more importantly, as Ericsson & Doyle (2004)
47 and, more recently, others (Baker 2011; McFall 2011; McFall 2014; Van Hoyweghen 2007) have
48 shown, even the part of the business that manages the oldest and best-understood insurance risk –
49 mortality – operates just beyond the limits of knowledge. Where calculations are supposed to
50 dominate, they often do not. It is telling that practitioners themselves do not systematically rely on a
51 clear Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, neither in finance nor in engineering. Rather,
52 professionals' discourse in business journals, for example, is closer to everyday parlance where 'risk'
53 denotes all kinds of potentially harmful future events, not only those the probability of which can be
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3 more or less exactly calculated. Moreover, instead of talking about the uncertainty/profit relationship,
4 financial institutions often structure their activities around a very different notion of risk/profit ratio.
5 In the latter case, the point is that although the level of risk cannot always be calculated in exact
6 numbers, it can nevertheless be estimated in a numerical fashion to a sufficient degree. Thus it can be
7 compared to the quantified estimation of gains.
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10 Obviously, in practice the distinction between risk and uncertainty is not as clear as Knight
11 made it out to be (see also Nowotny et al 2001; Renn 2008). For example, in his *Organized*
12 *Uncertainty*, Michael Power examines how things move from the sphere of unmeasurable uncertainty
13 to that of measurable risk. Power emphasizes the historical nature of the distinction: more and more
14 techniques are developed for turning uncertainties into objects of risk management. And he
15 concludes: 'Much of what we today call risk management is "uncertainty management" in Knightian
16 terms, i.e. efforts to manage "risk objects" for which probability and outcome data are, at a point in
17 time, unavailable or defective' (Power 2007, p. 26). Power's stress on the dynamics between
18 uncertainty and risk is valuable, especially as his book shows there are myriad ways in which
19 uncertainty can be practically organized, and how risk objects are constantly being constituted. Yet in
20 the end his argument leaves intact the notion that the distinction between risk and uncertainty itself is
21 pertinent in Knightian terms, as regards the fundamental continuum between them.
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29 In contrast, Pat O'Malley's book *Risk, Uncertainty and Government* complicates the picture,
30 in at least two ways. First, O'Malley claims that 'making the distinction between risk and uncertainty
31 cannot be regarded as setting up a rigid binary. It may be better to regard them as related along
32 multiple axes, with the effect that no single continuum (such as one running from statistical
33 probability to vague hunches) will adequately represent the relationship between them.' (O'Malley
34 2004, p. 21) O'Malley's argument is in line with the symptomatic issue that practitioners themselves
35 rarely have such a clear understanding of what really constitutes a 'risk'. Second, reflecting on liberal
36 forms of governance and conceptions of political organizations, from Jeremy Bentham to Knight and
37 then onwards to more recent management consultants such as Tom Peters, O'Malley recognizes that
38 sometimes the economization of uncertainty does not mean that uncertainty is (trans)formed into a
39 'risk'; rather, management utilizes uncertainty and governs through it, in a manner that does not do
40 away with it. His claim is that as there are technologies of risk, there are also technologies of
41 uncertainty; 'organisation' is not only on the risk side. Furthermore, he emphasizes that risk and
42 uncertainty are often 'in unstable and multiple relationships with each other' (O'Malley 2004, p. 26).
43 In other words, practices of calculation and other forms of understanding and organizing uncertainty
44 constantly flow into each other.
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53 The question is not whether insurance or other forms of economizing uncertainty are
54 'thoroughly' rational or able to calculate risks 'correctly'. Rather, the interesting thing is the
55 overflowing between the attempts to calculate and what *shadows* these attempts. The papers of the
56 special issue highlight how it is not always easy to say whether what the actors encounter, mitigate or
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3 create is uncertainty or risk. The contingency of the world is tamed to a degree, but the knowledge of
4 the exact degree is not assumed.
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7 **Insurance as uncertain business**

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9 Insurance institutions have had immense success during the past one hundred years, both in their
10 social and private forms. As the papers in this special issue point out, insurance should not be studied
11 as something inherently coherent and homogeneous. Rather, it operates through a number of
12 rationalities and technologies at work in the contemporary world. Therefore, a special issue which
13 addresses insurance has to take into account the dynamic ways in which events and practices have
14 both become subject to and have evaded processes of economization through working upon risk and
15 uncertainty. While most scholars in the social studies of insurance have focused on the ‘technical risk’
16 aspect of insurance and its central role in performing liberal forms of governance, this collection
17 stresses that insurance is also and always about proliferating and taming uncertainty. Insurance is an
18 ‘uncertain business’ (Ericson & Doyle 2004), characterized by competition for premiums that pushes
19 insurers into the unknown. Insurance practices are revealed as a never-ending balancing act between
20 the boundaries of knowledge-based risk protocols and the more speculative dynamics of uncertainty.
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24 In approaching insurance as a complex configuration with diverse risk and uncertainty
25 technologies, the issue responds to the following programmatic call by O’Malley. According to him it
26 is important to develop
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33 ‘a genealogical approach to risk and uncertainty, attending to their natures as the products of
34 contingency and invention rather than the effects of an inescapable “logic” of modernity,
35 capitalism or whatever. We should also develop some ways of analysing the governmental or
36 political implications of the various forms and combinations of uncertainty and risk. These
37 analyses would include examining the diverse ways in which risk and uncertainty might shape
38 the kinds of subjects we are to be made into; the practices through which we will be expected
39 to govern ourselves; and the ways we will be expected to imagine the world and prepare for
40 the future.’ (O’Malley 2004: 7)
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47 We consider O’Malley’s programme to be instructive for the collected papers here. It matches well
48 with the issues addressed in the articles, and helps to detect relationships between them. Hence we
49 want to highlight the three theme areas identified by O’Malley: first, a genealogical approach to the
50 taming of uncertainty and risk, second, the political implications of these configurations of uncertainty
51 and risk, and finally, the collective forms of imagining the future and the enactment of subjectivities
52 that follow from the previous two themes.
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56 *Genealogical approach.* While most of the articles collected here employ some historical
57 materials, more important than the historicity of the sources per se is that all papers help elaborate
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3 the contingent and multifaceted character of the process through which uncertainty is economized.
4 These contingencies of economization are often most easily discernible in studies based on historical
5 data. O'Malley's own paper in this collection, for example, scrutinizes the political conditions for
6 actuarial calculations becoming effective for the fire insurance in Australia in the early 20th century.
7 He shows that the specific forms of private and public government needed to be in place for actuarial
8 calculations to begin. Stephen J. Collier's paper emphasizes the other side of the coin: insurance
9 technologies are deployed as political technologies. Collier's contribution takes up the genealogy of a
10 public application of insurantal rationality in the US of 1960s. Here, insurantal rationality was used
11 to both control the harm done by catastrophes and to render private citizens more responsible than
12 before for the consequences of their own actions. In his story, environmental concerns, governmental
13 planning, and conceptions of moral and political philosophy come together to shape a specific case of
14 economizing catastrophe mitigation. As a political technology, insurance 'forged a new articulation
15 and accommodation between political government and processes of rationalization' (Collier).
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23 *Governmental and political implications.* The articles by O'Malley and Collier clearly
24 examine cases of governing through and with insurance. When these are juxtaposed with the other
25 articles in the collection, an appreciation for the variety of scales on which insurance is a political
26 question begins to emerge. In her micro-study of medical risk selection, Ine Van Hoyweghen
27 examines how the calculative devices applied in underwriting 'generate, intervene and re-arrange the
28 worlds in which they are deployed.' Insurability is not given, it is made. This insight opens the way
29 for an active politicization of insurance markets. 'If', as she puts it, 'markets are the result of
30 collective calculative devices, there are multiple market configurations possible'. José Ossandon's
31 work also deals with an overtly political issue, the parliamentary discussions and decisions concerning
32 the Chilean health insurance scheme and its reform. Different uses of the insurance technology seek
33 conflicting political purposes; the aims of creating social 'solidarity' clash with those where the
34 fundamental value is life understood as – and economized as – 'private property.' It is a conflict
35 between what the insurance institution is seen to be good for that separates the parties involved in the
36 dispute.
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44 *Imagining the future, shaping subjectivities.* The economization of uncertainty further implies
45 that the future must be imagined, pictured, and staged in a form that allows for its discounted value to
46 be estimated at the present moment. Also this activity can take many shapes. Lobo-Guerrero's
47 contribution discusses the practices of modelling catastrophes. This is a way of making the future
48 potentially present as something which can be used for creating capital; in the case of new instruments
49 of securitisation, the use of simulation implies a multi-layered manipulation of the ways in which time
50 is conceived, for the 'insurance event' to become insurable. If Lobo-Guerrero engages with the 'high
51 tech' of imagining the future, Lehtonen's paper takes on a much more mundane aspect of selling the
52 future, namely the marketing materials for private life insurance. Moreover, while these materials
53 stabilize the understanding of what an insurance policy is, and what it can do, they simultaneously try
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3 to mobilize the subjects of insurance. Technologies of economization are intimately linked with
4 technologies of the self. Lehtonen states that in the subjectification through private life insurance, ‘the
5 two sides of life insurance, rational calculation and affectivity, do not contradict each other. Instead,
6 the intensification of rational economic planning implies, simultaneously, the intensification of family
7 values and moral sentiments.’ Van Hoyweghen’s findings present a different angle on the interface
8 between insurance companies and their customers. Where Lehtonen concentrates on the materials
9 used for recruiting and mobilizing the potential customers, Van Hoyweghen shows how in the process
10 of underwriting, the same subjects’ scope of activity is very much reduced. This is done by the
11 calculative devices which are used for (pre)formatting customers and thus economizing uncertainty.
12 She claims that ‘during the underwriting process, the devices are exactly performed to keep applicants
13 at bay, so that their calculations do not disturb the insurance framing.’ What both Lehtonen and Van
14 Hoyweghen underline is another aspect of uncertainty: insurance companies work to shape their
15 relations with current or potential customers, yet, in the end, they remain indeterminate whether they
16 *can* stabilize these relationships. That is to say, insurance companies’ knowledge of their own
17 customers remains uncertain.
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21 In their very different ways the contributions to this issue can be understood as attempts to
22 better situate the role of insurance in economizing the vagaries of life. Insurance, as these articles tend
23 to agree, occupies a place at the turning point, where the distinction between risk and uncertainty is
24 being performed, not only as a means of taming uncertainty, but also at the same time of performing
25 new uncertainties. Practices of taming and untaming uncertainty come in many interdependent forms.
26 Insurance would not work unless it was attached to other ways in which concern for the future is
27 expressed both conceptually and practically. With the pensions crisis, the increase of environmental
28 risks, genomic diagnostics, and the proliferation of anti-discrimination regulations in insurance, the
29 need to address the ways in which uncertainty defies, exceeds and escapes the various practices of
30 insurance risk management, as these papers indicate, is becoming ever more urgent.
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18 **Notes**
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23 contributors to the conference; without them this issue would not exist.
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25 ² While for Knight true uncertainty is a friend of risk, it may thus also be a ‘false friend’, as Callon et al
26 convincingly argue in their book *Acting in an Uncertain World* (2009: 21; see also Latour & Ewald, 2003).
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